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Summary. — The voluminous literature on industrial catching-up in Southeast Asian countries has regularly argued that successful
catching-up largely depended on a committed state, which orchestrated industry development with a relatively uniform set of policies,
including R&D support, subsidies, trade restrictions, and local content requirements. In contrast, recent contributions from the technol-
ogy lifecycle literature have argued that policies should be tailored to diﬀering technological characteristics in industries for mass-
produced standardized goods, complex engineered products, and—as we argue—complex product systems (CoPS). In this paper, we
extend this argument by introducing a set of separate policy mixes for each industry type, which appears most capable of providing
the key resources required for catching-up: knowledge, market access, ﬁnancial investment and technology legitimacy. This framework
is used to analyze catching-up patterns in China’s wind, solar PV, and biomass power plant industries, drawing mainly on policy doc-
uments and 106 interviews with key industry actors.
We ﬁnd that traditional top-down catching-up policies played a decisive role in the development of China’s wind industry, but were of
limited importance in the early solar PV industry, and resulted only in a limited period of rapid growth in the biomass power plant indus-
try. The relative progress achieved in these three industries is not related to top-down policy guidance alone, but also to private sector
initiative, international interdependencies, and ﬂexibility in adapting policy mixes to each industry’s technological characteristics. These
results suggest that policy makers in newly industrializing countries (NICs) should avoid drafting generic sector plans, but should tailor
plans to individual industries, and respond to changing policy support needs as technological capacities and global competitiveness
develop.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on industrial catching up and infant industries
has provided a comprehensive account of how the remarkable
industrial and economic development in (East-) Asian coun-
tries has taken place. Empirical evidence often showed that
the state played a key role in orchestrating catching-up using
various policy instruments, including subsidies, trade restric-
tions, R&D support, and local content requirements (Rock,
Murphy, Rasiah, van Seters, & Managi, 2009). Scholars have
argued that state interventions should couple industry protec-
tion to competition, be based on long-term strategic goals and
have a high degree of coherence—i.e., combine centralized
decision-making structure within the state with a high degree
of public–private cooperation (Wade, 1988). ‘Successful’ pol-
icy interventions were in most cases shown to depend on
top-down policy making, requiring a committed, intervention-
ist state apparatus (labeled the ‘Asian development State’) clo-
sely involved in industry development (Angel & Rock, 2009;
Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Kim, 1997).
This paper aims at diﬀerentiating such stylized policy recom-
mendations in two main respects. First, we emphasize that
catching-up dynamics may considerably diﬀer between indus-
tries with varying technology characteristics. To this end we
follow recent conceptual contributions from the technology
lifecycle literature in distinguishing coarsely between the
catching-up challenges for industries with mass-produced
standardized goods (e.g., solar PV panels) versus complex
engineered products (e.g., wind turbines) (Hansen, Klitkou,
Borup, Scordato, & Wessberg, 2017; Huenteler, Schmidt,
Ossenbrink, & Hoﬀmann, 2016; Schmidt & Huenteler, 2016).
We further add a third technology type, complex product sys-
tems (CoPS) (e.g., biomass power plants) (Hobday, 1998,
2000).
Second, we connect catching-up studies with the literature
on innovation systems, to derive a set of policy mixes that
seem most adapted to speciﬁc catching-up requirements of
each industry type. The catching-up literature to date mostly
emphasizes supply-side policy interventions which support
latecomer ﬁrms in upgrading their knowledge-based techno-
logical capabilities (Morrison, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti,
2008). We broaden the focus to policy interventions that
may inﬂuence the innovation process in other important
dimensions related to market deployment, ﬁnancial invest-
ment, and technology legitimacy (cf. Binz, Truﬀer, &
Coenen, 2016). An analytical framework is derived that allows
scrutinizing how policy makers may provide latecomer ﬁrms
with access to key system resources in all four dimensions,
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and how resource formation processes may diﬀer between dif-
ferent industry types.
Our framework is illustrated with three renewable energy
industries that correspond with the three industry types
included in our framework; solar PV panels, wind turbines,
and biomass power plants, each of which has seen strong
development in China over the last decades. Based on a com-
parative analysis of public policy documents, secondary liter-
ature, and 106 expert interviews, we discuss the policy
support biographies of each industry in detail. Our analysis
identiﬁes signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the policy mixes that sup-
ported industry development. Top-down state intervention
played the most instrumental role in the catching-up process
for wind turbines, but were of lesser importance in the early
development phases of the solar PV industry. State interven-
tion in the biomass industry resulted in a limited period of
rapid growth. China’s relative success in developing these
industries can accordingly not be attributed to strategic top-
down governance alone, but is also reliant on diﬀerent forms
of private sector initiative, international interdependencies,
and the ﬂexibility of China’s decision makers in adapting pol-
icy mixes over time, to the speciﬁc needs of industries with
varying technology characteristics.
In the remainder we elaborate this argument as follows: we
ﬁrst review the catching-up literature and connect its views on
policy intervention with recent insights from technology lifecy-
cle and innovation system scholars. We then introduce a styl-
ized typology of technology-speciﬁc catching-up policy mixes,
which is empirically illustrated with examples from the Chi-
nese renewable energy sector. The paper ends with a discus-
sion of how our analytical framework and the Chinese
catching-up experience in renewable energy may inform a
research agenda and concrete policy recommendations for
other latecomer countries.
2. THEORY: CATCHING UP AND INDUSTRY
FORMATION
(a) Catching-up policies – the conventional view
Within economic history and the broader literature on
industrialization strategies and economic development, much
research has been conducted on the development and
catching-up of infant industries in developing countries
(Freeman, 1987; Lee & Lim, 2001; Perez, 1985). Of particular
interest have been the remarkable economic development of
post-War Japan and the development of the newly industrial-
izing countries (NIC) in East Asia, such as Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, since the
1980s (Amsden, 1992; Hobday, 1995; Mathews & Cho,
2007). Research in this ﬁeld has focused on analyzing how
the structural transformation of these economies could take
place in a relatively short period of time, and derived general-
izable lessons for industrial and economic development poli-
cies in other NICs. An extensive body of empirical studies
have highlighted the crucial role of the state in promoting
the development of young or emerging domestic industries
in Asian NICs (Chang, Cheema, & Mises, 2002; Lall, 1992;
Page, 1994; World Bank, 1993). In general, authors have
stressed the similarities of support models adopted across dif-
ferent countries, and ‘‘explicitly link[ed] state intervention and
rapid economic development” (Chen & Lees, 2016, p. 575). A
series of conditions have been identiﬁed as conducive for
achieving rapid and advanced levels of industry development
(summarized from Chen & Lees, 2016; Freeman, 1988; Kim,
1997; Kjaer, 2004; Wade, 1988, 1990):
 Policies were coherent and comprised mutually reinforc-
ing sets of ‘carrot and stick’ incentives, for example perfor-
mance based subsidies or sanctions (Chen & Lees, 2016;
Kjaer, 2004).
 Policy implementation involved close central co-
ordination among diﬀerent agencies and ministries in
charge of diﬀerent support instruments and functions,
e.g., MITI in Japan (Freeman, 1988)
 The overall orchestration was performed by powerful
governments that formulated strong long-term industrial-
ization strategies that provided overall priorities and con-
sistency (Freeman, 1988; Kim, 1997)
 The detailed implementation was undertaken by compe-
tent and well-remunerated bureaucracies that maintained
close contacts with ﬁrms (Wade, 1988, 1990)
 High degree of co-operation between government
bureaucrats and managers of private enterprise was estab-
lished, involving governments pressing ﬁrms to form indus-
try associations and co-operative bodies to coordinate
public–private interaction (Cimoli, Dosi, & Stiglitz, 2009;
Yeung, 2016)
 Withdrawal of industry protection was managed in a
gradual fashion. Close consultation and monitoring,
together with the strictly conditional terms on which sup-
port was provided, were the main mechanisms to ensure
that protection would be temporary (Wade, 1988).
China has increasingly become one of the focal countries in
literature in recent years (Altenburg, Schmitz, & Stamm, 2008;
Appelbaum, Parker, & Cao, 2011; Niosi & Reid, 2007; Yu,
Malerba, Adams, & Zhang, 2016). Like the earlier NICs,
China has a highly centralized state apparatus, and studies
on the rapid catching-up of Chinese industries have often
sought to draw parallels with the industry formation dynamics
identiﬁed in the earlier NIC. Consequently, China’s rapid eco-
nomic growth has been argued to be largely attributable to
strong state involvement in infant industries (cf. Lee, Cho, &
Jin, 2009; Liu, 2005; Malerba & Nelson, 2011; Sun, 2015;
Xiao, Tylecote, & Liu, 2013). For example, Chen and Lees
argue that China’s remarkable progress in developing renew-
able energy industries are due to an ”approach to governance
[that] conforms to the developmental state model” (Chen &
Lees, 2016, p. 4). Among others, this included a role for the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as
the central agency orchestrating the government’s vision,
strong links between government agencies and the mostly
state-owned power generation, distribution, and equipment
manufacturing industries, numerous policy documents detail-
ing the state’s vision, and a set of incentives including feed-
in tariﬀs, and sanctions for power companies not attaining
renewable portfolio targets (Chen & Lees, 2016). Liu and
Liang (2013) review 12 categories of clean energy technologies
and similarly stress the importance of the national innovation
strategy, pointing to central government agencies, a largely
state run science system, and dominance of state-owned enter-
prises (SOE) in energy sectors. They conclude that ‘‘China’s
advance in clean energy technology is a result of long-term
government research and development”, and that, like in
China, ‘‘active government involvement in innovation is com-
mon in the successful catch-up economies in East Asia” (Liu &
Liang, 2013, p. 496).
In this paper we will qualify the conventional view discussed
above in two main respects. First, an all-too-direct extension
of the developmental state model on recent catch-up experi-
ences in NICs like China appears problematic (Shen, 2016).
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